Bar, Bench and Eligibility beyond Advocacy: A Case for Recognising Judicial Officers under the AIJA (2025) Framework

The Supreme Court of India, in its recent judgment titled All India Judges Association and Others v. Union of India (2025 INSC 735) [‘AIJA case (2025)’], addressed, inter-alia, the eligibility criteria for candidates appearing in judicial service examinations. A key aspect of the ruling mandates that a candidate must have a minimum of three years of practice to be eligible to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination. This period is to be reckoned from the date of provisional enrolment with a Bar Council. Notably, the Court also extended certain accommodations for law clerks, allowing their tenure working under judges or judicial officers to be considered towards this three-year period.

It is common for fresh law graduates to join judges' chambers as law clerks without enrolling with a Bar Council. In some cases, chambers even stipulate that clerks defer enrolment until the completion of their tenure. In recognising law clerks’ experience towards eligibility, AIJA case (2025) sets an important precedent. However, several other categories remain omitted—legal researchers affiliated with law reporters, legal aid clinics, and think tanks, and in-house counsels briefing arguing counsels, among others. These individuals often work intimately with law and courts, but may remain ineligible under a literal application of the new eligibility rule due to the absence of enrolment or ‘active practice’.

Among these overlooked categories, one particularly compelling case warrants attention: that of judicial officers already in the judicial services a state. Anecdotal evidence and a conversation with a friend presently in service revealed a discernible and growing trend — judicial officers aspiring to re-enter service in their home states or regions of preference through competitive examinations conducted by other states, even at the expense of forfeiting their accrued seniority. Many such officers had initially entered service without the prescribed three years of prior advocacy practice, and in several cases, without ever enrolling with a Bar Council.

This brings forth an important legal and policy question: whether these candidates, having served as judicial officers but lacking three-year practice as advocates, be eligible to write examinations for judicial services of another states?

The gravity of this issue is heightened by the Court’s express mention of only one exempted category — law clerks — from the strict application of the three-year ‘practice’ rule (para 88). Further, the court observed: “This [first-hand experience of the working of the court system and administration of justice] is possible only when a candidate is exposed to the atmosphere in the court by assisting the seniors and observing how the lawyers and the Judges function in court.” (para 83)

The judgment is conspicuously silent on the eligibility of serving judicial officers in this context. However, a purposive and harmonious construction of the judgment suggests that these candidates ought to be deemed eligible for several cogent reasons:

First, the rationale behind (re)instituting the three-year experience rule, as explained in AIJA case (2025), is to ensure that candidates acquire first-hand exposure to the court system and the administration of justice, thereby equipping them to understand the intricacies of judicial function (para 83). The Court observed that such exposure is acquired through assisting seniors and observing courtroom proceedings. Yet, a judicial officer, by virtue of presiding over proceedings, managing cases, and delivering judgments, gains a level of immersion in the judicial system that is both broader and deeper than what a practicing advocate may obtain within a similar timeframe.

Second, the judgment explicitly creates an exception for law clerks having worked with any judge or judicial officer in India—presumably on account of their proximity to judicial work and their role in researching legal issues, briefing judges, and attending proceedings. It is difficult to see why serving judicial officers, who perform these functions at a higher, decision-making capacity, should be excluded from a similar dispensation. If the law clerk’s experience warrants recognition, the more substantial and comprehensive experience of a judge logically deserves at least equivalent, if not greater, consideration.

Third, AIJA case (2025) itself provides a precedent for recognising internal career progression within the judiciary. While deciding on issues related to reservations for promotions from Civil Judge (Junior Division) to Civil Judge (Senior Division) through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE), the Court held that a judicial officer becomes eligible for such promotion after three years of service. If three years as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) suffices to qualify a candidate for elevation to a senior judicial post through a departmental exam, it seems inconsistent to deny a similar candidate the opportunity to write an open competitive examination for an equivalent post in another state.

Fourth, Judicial officers undergo rigorous post-selection institutional training at judicial academies, equipping them with skills in court management, procedural law, evidence appraisal, and judgment writing — competencies directly aligned with the responsibilities sought to be fulfilled through the (re)introduced eligibility requirement. To disregard such structured and specialised training in favour of exclusive advocacy experience would be a misplaced privileging of form over substance.

Maturity Beyond ‘Active Practice’

The underlying principle behind reintroducing the three-year practice rule is the belief that mature candidates with practical court exposure are better suited for judicial responsibilities. While active advocacy practice is one pathway to this maturity, it is neither the sole nor necessarily the most effective means. Judicial officers, by virtue of their daily responsibilities in managing courtrooms, applying laws, and writing judgments, embody the very qualities the eligibility criteria seek to foster.

Though the explicit case of serving judicial officers lacking three years of advocacy practice is omitted from the AIJA (2025) judgment — and even from the exception carved out (i.e. only for law clerks) — a strict and unduly literal reading would risk frustrating the broader intent of the judgment. Recognising the service of these candidates as equivalent to, or even superior to, the requisite three-year practice may be a logical and equitable step forward. Such a move would honour both the letter and the spirit of judicial reform, ensuring that experience gained within the judiciary is appropriately valued in shaping its future.

Author Nitish Rai Parwani is a trained lawyer from India, and is currently pursuing D.Phil from University of Oxford