Charting New Waters

Abstract

This article examines maritime security as a cornerstone of India–Africa cooperation, focusing on naval diplomacy, counter-piracy operations, and responses to emerging threats in the Western Indian Ocean. It highlights opportunities, challenges, and pathways for sustainable collaboration.

Introduction

The Indian Navy, in a rescue operation just shy of the three-month mark from when the Malta-flagged commercial ship MV Ruen was hijacked by Somali pirates, successfully arrested the culprits and sent them to India for prosecution.[1] This incident raised an important reminder of how vulnerable India's economy, security, and diplomatic outreach toward Africa are tied to the marine realm.

India's coastline of over 7,500 km and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of about 2 million square km make the domain essential for trade, supply chains and security in the domain as it does for Africa's 38 coastal or island states who rely on maritime connections for approximately 90% of their trade, despite many experiencing "sea blindness," having historically looked towards or along the land for solutions. The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is resource-rich but has significant problems of piracy and geopolitical issues, making the region an ideal backdrop where there is significant potential for India-Africa collaboration. This article explores that potential, the challenges and the way forward.

Strategic Importance and Current Cooperation

The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) is a strategic crossroad where commerce, resources and security converge. Trade routes through the region link India to energy suppliers and markets in Africa and beyond, and coastal states collectively claim vast maritime domains.[2] The ocean’s natural assets have been conservatively estimated at about US$333.8 billion, and roughly nine out of ten African trade consignments still move by sea.[3] These facts make oceanic stability a direct economic and strategic interest for both India and African littoral states. At the same time, the WIO faces persistent non-traditional threats: piracy, sea terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and smuggling. The political spill-overs from land crises across North and East Africa, and fragile governance in several coastal states, have intensified these threats and raised the costs of maritime disorder for all users of the sea lanes.

India’s response has combined naval diplomacy, capacity building and multilateral engagement. New Delhi has expanded patrols and antipiracy deployments, contributed to counter-piracy convoys in the Gulf of Aden, and conducted high visibility naval visits and humanitarian missions that build goodwill and interoperability. Initiatives framed domestically as SAGAR and MAHASAGAR translate into coast guard training, provision of patrol vessels and surveillance support for island and continental partners such as Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique and Kenya. Multilateral platforms have also helped: the Indian Ocean Rim Association provides a diplomatic forum for oceanic cooperation, while the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium fosters professional naval contact with several African navies.[4] Exercises such as MILAN and newer bilateral drills enhance practical interoperability and information sharing. AIKEYME, which stands for "Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement," is also a multilateral naval exercise co-hosted by India and Tanzania to enhance maritime cooperation and security with African nations.[5]

Despite these advances, institutional gaps remain. India is not formally embedded in every regional coordination mechanism that governs the WIO, and African states vary widely in their policing and surveillance capacity. At the same time, the presence of other external powers in the region has altered strategic calculations and accelerated cooperation. For India and its partners, the imperative is clear: sustained maritime engagement that combines operational presence with legal, technical and capacity support is essential to secure common interests in the Indian Ocean.

Challenges

The Indian Ocean islands occupy important strategic positions along vital maritime chokepoints that leave them crucial for any security infrastructure in the WIO. Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros are next to the key sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that connect the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and some of the most important shipping lanes that allow for the transportation of goods from Asia and Australia to the West.[6] These SLOCs allow for a substantial portion of global trade, including energy transportation to Asia, but also make these vulnerable to piracy, terrorism and various non-traditional security threats.

India’s interest in these islands largely stems from both its own need to ensure its energy imports and forays into the world, and its desire to counter external powers’ influence in the nations bordering its territorial waters.

The growing Chinese presence through the Maritime Silk Road initiative and the establishment of a military base in Djibouti illustrate a permanent and potentially aggressive role in the regional domain, intensifying competition for influence.[7] China, through concessional loans and commercial agreements that have at times resulted in debt dependency, has entered into a competitive dynamic with India.[8]

This presence also gives China the capacity to provide military support tied to regional infrastructure development. The new naval base in Djibouti represents a slow-moving strategic shift aimed at countering India's influence, viewed by policymakers as part of the “string of pearls” strategy. These developments push India to balance engagement in cooperative security with African littoral states while ensuring a strategic counterbalance to Beijing's maritime role.[9]

India enjoys rich cultural and historical connections with a number of Indian Ocean Island states, but structurally its oceanic engagement in the WIO faces challenges. Many of these islands are located near strategic chokepoints like the Mozambique Channel and Bab-el-Mandeb, and are therefore part of the regional security calculus.

At the same time, India is not an official party to some of the main regional frameworks for governing naval security in this region - the Djibouti Code of Conduct, for example - which limits its ability to engage in collaborative anti-piracy and nautical law enforcement activities.[10]

The Way Ahead

India should have a more holistic and inclusive approach to the complexities of sea engagement in the WIO. This includes moving away from a narrow security-centric focus to a Pan-African broadness that aligns with the priorities of African littorals. Enhancing cooperation in the blue economy, research, and climate resilience for mutual benefit builds up trust. Key considerations for India as a maritime partner include:

First, devise layered approaches that incorporate diplomatic, economic, cultural, and defence aspects and have a sustainable presence that considers changes in the regional dynamic.

Second, create or bolster a multilateral framework that would facilitate maritime security and stability, without influencing regional partners to be forced into a binary choice yet still protecting shared interests.

Ultimately, sustained partnerships in the WIO will depend on India demonstrating reliability and its sensitivity in applying priority to the regional agenda, equating to the realm of outcomes. In the long-term framework of developmental and strategic engagement, India can assume a maritime partner role while significantly contributing to the security and prosperity of African littoral states. This development agenda engages with African priorities, while balance with cooperation and stability will have at its heart shaping a stable, inclusive maritime order in the space. India’s evolving partnership with African littoral states will not only secure shared economic interests but also shape the future geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean region.

Conclusion:

The seas that connect India and Africa are not just trade routes; they are lifelines of security, growth, and shared destiny. Strengthening maritime cooperation is therefore more than strategy; it is about building trust, resilience, and mutual prosperity. By broadening its engagement beyond defence to encompass the blue economy, climate action, and capacity building, India can prove itself a partner that listens as much as it leads. In navigating these shared waters together, India and Africa can craft a maritime future rooted in stability, inclusivity, and enduring partnership.

Sources:

Picture Credit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ISPS_code_Southampton.jpg

Content:

[1] Rajat Pandit, ‘Indian Navy rescues hijacked vessel MV Ruen from 35 pirates; all crew members safe’ TNN (Delhi, 16 March 2024) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-navy-rescues-hijacked-vessel-mv-ruen-from-35-pirates-all-crew-members-safe/articleshow/108551973.cms> Accessed 9 August 2025.

[2] P.V. Rao, ‘Managing Africa's maritime domain: issues and challenges’ (2010) 10 (1) Journal of the Indian Ocean Region <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2013.847559> Accessed 9 August 2025.

[3] Abhishek Mishra, India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean (ORF Occasional Paper 221, 2019) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-africa-maritime-cooperation/> Accessed 9 August 2025.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Anum Khan, ‘India’s Maritime Capacity-Building and Capability-Enhancement in the Western Indian Ocean’ (National Maritime Foundation, 23 July 2025) <https://maritimeindia.org/indias-maritime-capacity-building-and-capability-enhancement-in-the-western-indian-ocean/> Accessed 9 August 2025.

[6] Mishra (n 3).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Rao (n 2).

[9] Rao (n 2).

[10] Lisa Otto, ‘India’s Ocean: Indian Maritime Diplomacy in the African Maritime Domain’ in Timothy Stapleton (ed), African Navies: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge 2022).